Abstract: Legal Metrology's requirements can be transferred into the IT security domain applying a generic set of standardized rules provided by the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408). We will outline the transfer and cross validation of such an approach. As an example serves the integration of Legal Metrology's requirements into a recently developed Common Criteria based Protection Profile for a Smart Meter Gateway designed under the leadership of the Germany's Federal Office for Information Security. The requirements on utility meters laid down in the Measuring Instruments Directive (MID) are incorporated. A verification approach to check for meeting Legal Metrology's requirements by their interpretation through Common Criteria's generic requirements is also presented.
Introduction
To check for conformity of measurement instruments with the requirements of the Measuring Instruments Directive 2004/22/CE (MID) [1] , several helpful Guidelines have been developed [2] , [3] . Currently the tailoring of essential requirements to all kinds of IT components including validation recommendations predominate, making the guides rich in detail and therefore demand a sound expert knowledge when performing individual tests.
Thus it is proposed that legal metrology shall increasingly rely on IT components that are in accordance with widely accepted technical rules and standards. This applies in particular for all-purpose components that are not exclusively used in measuring systems such as, e.g., data transmission components or operating systems. Consequentially, there is a need for procedures to reasonably handle this new approach [3] .
Legal Metrology (LM) and IT Security are different domains with partly quite an unequal understanding of how the "security" aspect is rendered, e.g. the protection of sensitive data and the defined roles (s. Fig. 1 ). In this contribution we will outline the transfer and cross validation of Legal Metrology's requirements for utility meters into the IT security domain, applying a generic set of rules provided by the Common Criteria (CC, ISO/IEC 15408), i.e. their integration into a recently developed Protection Profile for a Smart Meter Gateway designed under the leadership of the Germany's Federal Office for Information Security [7, 8] . To this end a verification method to check for meeting Legal Metrology's requirements by their interpretation through CC's generic requirements was developed and applied. As a result, the non-congruent parts were extracted. They and only they further have to be covered by metrology-specific regulations.
The Common Criteria Approach
In the last decade, an international standard for IT security, the so-called Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC, ISO/IEC 15408) [8] has been developed. It provides guidance for security evaluation by providing generic requirements for major security functionalities of IT products and assurance measures to be applied to these functionalities. The 
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means to adapt the generic requirements to particular application areas are the so-called Protection Profiles, which are pre-designed in the CC standard. While the protection profile is a means to express the security requirements in a comparable way, another instrument of the CC standard, the so-called Security Target, is a means to express the security function implemented in a particular product. By matching security targets with protection profiles, the evaluation of compliance with requirements is supported.
The big advantage of the CC approach is the comparability of evaluation results independently achieved by security evaluation bodies, besides the reference to the latest state-of-the-art of IT security. An aspect of special importance is that CC enforces the definition and clear description of assumptions and environmental conditions, under which a protection profile and a security target have been set up.
Comparability is obviously only given under same assumptions and conditions. The approach is applicable to products that may be implemented in hardware, firmware, application software or any combination of them. The evaluation process establishes a level of confidence that the security functionalities of IT products under evaluation meet the requirements. The CC is therefore useful as a guide for the development and for the evaluation of IT products, even for their procurement. The CC is intentionally flexible, enabling a range of evaluation methods to be applied to a broad variety of IT products. Though the approach of CC is very valuable and the only systematic and comprehensive one available, it is not a scheme that could simply be applied by the developer of a system quasi as an add-on to the normal specification. The levels of definition of security functions and protection profiles differ considerably from those a programmer needs. Especially for already existing complex systems like an operating system, it is necessary to interpret the security means implemented with regard to the security functions required by the protection profile.
Several evaluations of operating systems have been performed (Windows 2000 to Windows Vista, SuSE Linux, Red Hat Linux [9] ) by the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) [10] . Because of the complexity of the evaluation object, this was only possible by a cooperation of the evaluator with the manufacturer of the operating system.
To date, a successful application of CC-based methods in the legal metrology area is not known. This is, on the one hand, not fully explainable since the IT related requirements, as outlined above, are well structured in guides like [2] and [3] and, therefore, well prepared for a revision in terms of a protection profile. On the other hand, it is comprehensible since the way of thinking and the terminology used in metrology and IT security are quite different. It will be a challenge in the near future to bring together these two worlds for the significant benefit of the IT security of measuring instruments.
Basically, the developing process of a protection profile starts with an analysis of the threats the target of evaluation is exposed to (s. Fig. 2 ). In a standard analysis who or what is the origin of a threat, roles are defined that are performed by persons. It is presumed that some roles intend to perform threats (A) to (C). For some roles this is not assumed (e.g. an administrator of any IT installation), who enjoy more confidence. A protection profile therefore does not require the same protection means for each role.
In countries where metrology is legally controlled, the roles and threats to be assumed are defined by law, to some extent. In general, only the surveillance officer and no other person has privileges. When a measuring instrument is in use, it has to be protected against threats by anyone else. To secure the infrastructure against several kinds of threats of physical and/or logical occurrence, and to ensure privacy of personalized data, a Gateway with specific properties is demanded and will be implemented between wide area and local networks (s. Fig. 3 ). This Gateway has to meet both, the requirements of a recently developed Protection Profile (PP) [13] designed under the leadership of the Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), applying the generic set of rules provided by the Common Criteria (CC) [8] , and the legal regulations for measurement devices with their own guidelines to treat software and IT components in measurement systems, the OIML D-31, WELMEC Guide 7.2 and national Legal Metrology's requirements the PTB-A50.7 [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] .
Furthermore a Technical Guideline (TG) also designed under the leadership of the Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) defines interoperability properties and test requirements [14] .
In such a multidisciplinary approach, the basis for mutual comprehension is a similar "language". Therefore, we propose that Legal Metrology's requirements, laid down, e.g. by OIML, WELMEC or nationally should be transferred into an international standard.
To this end, a transfer of national Legal Metrology's requirements for utility meters, the PTB requirements PTB-A50.7 [4] , into the IT security domain, i.e. their integration into the PP, needs to be performed by utilizing the evaluation toolbox provided by the latter domain, the CC's generic requirements.
A reversed approach, the derivation of modified configuration rules for the validation of standard Operating Systems in legal Metrology ( [6] , [7] ) was already developed and successfully applied by our group by merging of edited configuration rules, extracted from a CC-based security evaluation, with software requirements for Legal Metrology (s. Fig. 4 ).
Fig. 4:
Synergetic approach to merge the CCbased security evaluation of an Operating System with software requirements for legal metrology (OIML D31) [7] .
With these experiences we aimed to develop and apply a verification method to check for congruency of national legal regulations by their interpretation through IT security experts using CC's generic requirements. Before going into the description of the methodology, let's spend a view words about the national metrological requirements laid down in the document PTB A50-7.
National metrological requirements which render 2004/22/EC.
The national metrological requirements, laid down in the document PTB A50-7 and define the requirements on electronic and software steered measurement instruments and auxiliary devices for electricity, gas, water and heat (utility meters, i.e. commodity meters). It renders a realization of the general requirements laid down in the MID and is compatible to WELMEC Guide (7.2) "Software" [3] . It can be assumed as a form of standardization document, a regulative construction and testing directive. See figure 5 for a pictorial description of what was considered and who was involved in the genesis of the PTB-A50.7.
It is the aim of our approach to check for the coverage of the security requirements of PTB-A50.7 by the PP.
VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
We developed and applied a verification method to check for the coverage, i.e. congruency, of national legal regulations by their interpretation through IT security experts using CC's generic requirements. In a first step we, i.e. Metrologists, identified distinguishable classes of elements within the PTB A50.7 (s. Fig. 6 ).
Class 1: Security elements.
Criterion: Security relevant elements, which should be covered by the PP.
Class2
: Security elements, which should be covered by Technical Guideline Criterion: Definition of Interoperability, properties and test requirements Class3: Elements of PTB-A50.8 (a special successor of PTB-A50.7 for smart meter gateways) Criterion: Metrological relevant elements which are not covered by aforementioned securityrelated classes 1 and 2.
Class 4: Obsolete elements.
Criterion: e.g. out-dated technology, etc. The subsequent procedure can be summarized as follows (s. Fig. 7 ):
• Find the requirements in the national requirements PTB-A 50.7 to be part of the PP/TG.
• Identify the chosen adapted generic requirements from the CC with all dependencies and hierarchies to cover the PTB-A 50.7's requirements.
•
Compare the meaning of the CC generic requirements with the meaning of legal metrology's requirements.
Identify conspicuous elements (match and mismatch)!
Fig. 7: Congruency Analysis Scheme
In such an analysis the following conspicuous elements are expected:
• Security relevant elements which should be reintegrated using CC.
•
Metrologically relevant, non-security elements which are part of additional requirements, to be formulated in a new "regulative container", the PTB-A50.8
Expected Cases of conspicuous elements: Disjunctive elements, i.e. requirements not, or only partly congruent to the CC, are distinguished into security and non-security relevant items. These are either reintegrated into the PP or should be considered as part of the Technical Guidelines (TG), which define the vicinity of the Gateway and adequate testing measures, whereas the latter will be part of a new regulative "container", the PTB-A50.8 (s. Fig. 7 ).
GENERAL FINDINGS
First of all it can be stated that we found no additional obsolete elements. We did not find further completely disjunctive elements, which mean that the reintegration process could be omitted.
Since the legal metrology regulations (LMR) are rich in details, they are inherently much more tailored to metrology. Therefore the chosen CC equivalent is often much too general which could lead to ambiguities! On the other hand the PP is inherently much stricter than the LMR regarding security aspects. This may lead to: a.) Over-coverage: PP requirements are stronger than LMR, or b.) Under-coverage: PP restricts the LMR.
Case a.) has been detected with our method whereas no indication for case b.) has been detected.
Further inconsistencies between PP and LMR were detected, and we found redundancies in the LMR where different parts reference to the same part of the annexes.
Therefore we can conclude that
A re-integration of conspicuous elements is not necessary. Bijectivity is not provided by the transformation due to possible ambiguities.
Hence, it follows that PTB-A50.7 and therefore the European Directive, the MID, cannot be reconstructed from the PP in toto.
Since ambiguities are the most severe problems arising in such a transfer approach, we consider it helpful to give an example:
The national requirement, which renders the requirements of Therefore we propose an supplement to the Technical Guideline or, which is more applicable, PTB-A50.8 requirements for metrological and metrologically refined security relevant elements.
CONCLUSIONS
Disjunctive elements, i.e. requirements not, or only partly congruent to the Common Criteria, are distinguished into security and non-security relevant items. These are either reintegrated into the Protection Profile or should be considered as part of the Technical Guidelines, which define the vicinity of the Gateway and adequate testing measures, whereas the latter will be part of a new regulative "container", the PTB-A50.8, the special successor of PTB-A50.7 for smart meter gateways.
Although the results are restricted to this particular scenario, this approach principally proves the feasibility of a reliable transfer of specific European and national legal requirements into an international evaluation methodology scheme for IT security. The Common Criteria proved also to be an international "language" to describe Legal Metrology's specific national security aspects allowing their objective international comparison.
This example underlines the necessity and usefulness of using well established, internationally excepted standards and rules for Legal Metrology. It further indicates in what direction the future development of IT related requirements should be brought forward in order to manage the more and more sophisticated IT components and simultaneously not to overburden authorities of Legal Metrology.
